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Abstract: 
The new right advocated policies that aided the accumulation of profits and wealth in 
fewer hands with the argument that it would promote investment, thereby creating 
more jobs and more prosperity for all. However financial markets provide 
opportunities for investment without creating jobs and, as the global financial crisis 
has revealed, speculative investment feeds an ephemeral prosperity that can be wiped 
out in a short time period. Inequities resulting from new right policies – including the 
deregulation of labour markets and the reduction of government spending – reduced 
consumer demand which had to be propped up with consumer credit and mortgage 
debt. Financial deregulation, also promoted by the new right, enabled financial 
institutions to dictate government policy and enabled wealth to be channelled into 
speculative investments exacerbating the volatility of share and housing markets. The 
combination of household debt and unregulated speculative investment led to the 
collapse of the subprime mortgage market followed by the bankruptcy of major 
financial institutions and the collapse of share markets around the world. Yet the 
Rudd government continues to place its faith in markets as a way out of the crisis. 
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Neoliberalism and the global financial crisis 
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The new right promoted a fundamentalist view of markets that came to be referred to 
as economic rationalism in Australia and, more widely, as neoliberalism. It advocated 
the replacement of government functions and services with those provided by private 
profit-seeking firms operating in the market (privatization); deregulation of labour 
and financial markets; deregulation of business activities; free trade; and smaller 
government through reduced taxes, spending and regulation. These policies were 
promoted in the name of free markets, economic growth and the public interest (Beder 
2006b, ch.4).  
The new right argued that competition and unrestrained selfishness was of benefit to 
the whole society in capitalist societies (Sheil 2000, 26). It asserted that as a nation 
gets wealthier the wealth will ‘trickle down’ to the poor because it is invested and 
spent thereby creating jobs and prosperity. In fact the global financial crisis has 
shown that financial markets provide opportunities for investment that provide 
relatively few extra jobs and that feed an ephemeral prosperity that can be wiped out 
in days. 
Neoliberal theories were embraced by big business because they provided a 
legitimation for their pursuit of self-interest and avenues for business expansion 
(Beder 2006a, 151). They supported the argument that government regulation 
interfered with business and undermined ‘enterprise culture’ (Self 1993, 72). In this 
view government intervention in the management of the economy is unnecessary and 
unwise because the Market is a self-correcting mechanism. There was also some 
appeal in free market ideology for governments too in that it absolved them of 
responsibility for economic performance (Beder 2006a, 8).  
 
OUTCOMES AND INEQUITIES 
As neoliberal policies were implemented around the world disparities in wealth and 
income increased and poverty increased, contradicting neoliberal theories that by 
increasing the wealth at the top everyone would be better off. 
In Australia economic rationalism – adopted by the Hawke/Keating governments in 
the 1980s and continued by the Howard government in the 1990s – resulted in efforts 
to reduce government deficits, reduced taxation for high income earners, deregulation 
of financial institutions, floating of the dollar, reduction in tariffs and import 
restrictions, privatisation, and business deregulation (Garnaut 1994, 53-4). These 
reforms – termed ‘restructuring’ – were supposed to enhance economic efficiency, 
productivity and industrial competitiveness (Beder 2006b, 65). 
The reinvigoration of the Australian manufacturing sector that was supposed to result 
from this ‘economic restructuring’ never occurred. The extra money generated in the 
1980s by lower corporate taxes, higher profits and deregulation was seldom reinvested 
 4 
in productivity. Rather it was squandered on ‘increased executive salaries, increased 
luxury consumption and a mass of unproductive investment, seeking wealth through 
shuffling paper, takeover bids and counter-bids’ (McEachern 1991, 80). The Australian 
ideal of egalitarianism was destroyed as wealth disparties in Australia began to rival 
and exceed other countries (Thompson 1992, 16).  
The same policy prescriptions, referred to as the Washington Consensus, were forced 
on developing nations at an international level through the use of loan conditions and 
structural adjustment packages by the World Bank and the IMF. The Washington 
Consensus benefited transnational corporations and large companies, often at the 
expense of small local businesses, and always at the expense of the poor (Beder 2006b, 
46). It gave economic goals priority over social goals, destroying socially beneficial 
traditions and desirable aspects of cultures in the process (Stilwell 1993, 36). 
Progressive taxation systems were dismantled and government social services 
decimated. The aim was for governments to be responsible for little more than law and 
order and national defence (Williamson 1994, 17).  
Nations following IMF prescriptions did not prosper: ‘the majority of those nations 
that have followed the IMF’s advice have experienced profound economic crises: low or 
even declining growth, much larger foreign debts and the stagnation that perpetuates 
systemic poverty.’ Some countries that had declined the IMF’s ‘enhanced structural 
adjustment’ loans were in contrast better off (Kolko 1998, 21). 
In the two decades before the introduction of the Washington Consensus government, 
spending and welfare schemes were looked on with approval and the income (as 
measured by mean GDP per  capita) grew by 73 percent in Latin America and 34 
percent in Africa. In the following two decades, as the Washington Consensus was 
applied to most nations in Africa and Latin America, incomes in Africa declined by 23 
percent and the Latin American economies only grew by 6 percent (Palast 2002, 48). 
The gap between rich and poor has increased. Forty four percent of people in 
developing nations live in poverty and unemployment doubled in the last decade of the 
20th Century (Blustein 2002, E01, Lapper 2002, 1, Forero 2002, A-1). Even the IMF 
admits that ‘in recent decades, nearly one-fifth of the world population have regressed’ 
(IMF World Economic Outlook report quoted in Palast 2002, 50).  
In the US ‘[t]hree decades of neoliberal economic policy has led to widest gap between 
rich and poor in America as compared to other industrialized nations…Currently the 
top 20% of population in America receive about 50% of income, while the lowest 20% 
get merely 3.4% of the income, and the top 1% own 40% of the wealth.’ (Torbat 2008) 
Although average wages increased by 2.5 percent between 2000 and 2007 this increase 
actually occurred at the top of the wage hierarchy with Wall Street traders and 
executives earning a billion dollars between 2003 and 2007 (Muzaffar 2008), while the 
real wage of the median household fell over that time (Sapir 2008).  
Such disparities in income have been accepted because greed has been 
institutionalised and legitimised as a driver of free market economies: ‘The rapacious 
acquisition and accumulation of wealth by an elite is sanctified as a vital pre-requisite 
for the progress and prosperity of the people. The poor, it is argued, will eventually 
benefit from the wealth created by the elite.’ (Muzaffar 2008) 
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FINANCIAL MARKET COERCION 
Whilst the IMF and the World Bank enforced the Washington Consensus on poorer 
countries in desperate need of capital, other more affluent countries were forced into 
adopting the same formula by the world’s financial markets. Their vulnerability to 
these markets was facilitated by financial deregulation.  
Financial deregulation involved three actions: the opening up of a nation to the free 
flow of capital in and out of it; the removal of regulations on financial institutions 
operating within a country; and the removal of political controls from the central bank 
(Patnaik 1999). In this way the financial sector of a nation becomes part of the 
international financial sector rather than a part of the domestic economy and it serves 
the interests of global financial institutions rather than the interests of the local 
people or national governments (Beder 2006b, 47-52).  
Financial deregulation was demanded by business interests, particularly large 
financial firms and transnational corporations that wanted to be free to move their 
money around. The economic argument for financial deregulation, supplied by free 
market think tanks and economic advisors, was that the free and unregulated 
movement of capital is more efficient, because capital can move to where it gets the 
best returns (Helleiner 1996, 194, Bell 1997, 103-4). 
As a result of financial deregulation governments become accountable to international 
financial markets. According to Professor of Economics, Prabhat Patnaik (1999): 
An economy exposed to the free flow of international finance capital, 
however, is obsessed with the need to appease international financiers, to 
retain their ‘confidence’: the thrust of policies in such an economy therefore, 
even in principle, is not towards serving the interests of the people but 
towards serving the interests of the speculators, which  represents an 
inversion of democracy. 
Similarly, the Economics Editor of the Financial Times, Peter Norman (Norman 
1994), observed: 
Because they process the many billions of dollars worth of investments 
flowing across national borders each day, the markets have become the 
police, judge and jury of the world economy—a worrying thought given that 
they tend to view events and policies through the distorting lenses of fear 
and greed. 
The judgement of financial markets is neither wise nor well thought out. Rather it is  
panic-driven and herd-like. Decisions to buy and sell are not made on the basis of 
what is good for a nation’s economy but rather on the basis of trying to second guess 
other investors. This merely serves to create economic instability and does little to 
foster productive long-term investment. Investment capital that could otherwise be 
used in production is used for gambling on the economies of various countries. 
Professor Walden Bello (Bello 2008) notes: 
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The problem with investing in financial sector operations is that it is 
tantamount to squeezing value out of already created value. It may create 
profit, yes, but it does not create new value...  Because profit is not based on 
value that is created, investment operations become very volatile and prices 
of stocks, bonds, and other forms of investment can depart very radically 
from their real value. 
Financial deregulation exposes ‘the economy to the vortex of speculative capital 
movements, that is, to the flows of short-term finance in search of quick profits.’ For 
example, only ten percent of transactions in currency markets represent actual trade. 
The rest is largely speculative (Patnaik 1999, Toussaint 1998, 52). The rapid inflow 
and outflow of speculative finance can cause crises in national economies (Patnaik 
1999). David Korten (quoted in Barlow and Clarke 2002, 93), once a senior advisor to 
USAID, says of these speculators: 
Each day, they move more than two trillion dollars around the world in 
search of quick profits and safe havens, sending exchange rates and stock 
markets into wild gyrations wholly unrelated to any underlying economic 
reality. With abandon they make and break national economies, buy and 
sell corporations and hold politicians hostage to their interests.  
Thomas Friedman (Friedman 1999, 90-91) uses the term the ‘Electronic Herd’ to refer 
to ‘the faceless stock, bond and currency traders sitting behind computer screens all 
over the globe, moving their money around with the click of a mouse from mutual 
funds to pension funds to emerging market funds’ and the ‘big multinational 
corporations who now spread their factories around the world, constantly shifting 
them to the most efficient, low cost producers’. It is they who have become the final 
arbiters of ‘good’ government policy.  
Countries can still retain a veneer of democracy with choice between major parties, 
but because of the constraints imposed by the need to please international financial 
markets, the policy differences between the major parties is minimal. They all adopt 
the  same free market policies (Patnaik 1999). Governments that try to deviate are 
punished by the markets, in particular, ‘the major international banks, large 
transnational corporations with major financial dealing, fund managers within key 
private financial institutions, and the key credit-ratings agencies (such as Moody’s)’ 
(Bell 1997, 105). 
 
INEQUALITY AND DEBT 
Inequities in income in many countries, resulting from neoliberal policies, meant that 
consumer demand could not keep up with production capacity. Consequently profits 
from investing in production declined and economic growth slowed. Once governments 
would have fed demand through government spending, but neoliberalism precluded 
this. Instead consumer demand was increased through bank credit to consumers 
(Torbat 2008). This temporarily ensured continued economic growth in many 
countries. In the US, cuts in interest rates ensured more borrowing in order to sustain 
economic growth (Gupta 2008). 
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Consumer credit was augmented by mortgage debt. The middle-classes in the US, for 
example, borrowed money through home mortgages, to pay for consumer items and to 
be able to invest in the booming stockmarket (Sapir 2008). More and more people were 
given these loans despite declining wages, because rising house prices seemed to 
guarantee that the loan institutions could not lose. If people defaulted on their 
mortgages the repossession of their homes would cover their debt. ‘By 2004, 
Americans were using home equity to finance as much $310 billion a year in personal 
consumption.’ (Gupta 2008) By 2008 household debt was up to 93 percent of US GDP 
(Sapir 2008), and was a key driver of economic growth in the US (Gupta 2008). 
Low interest rates meant more home buyers could afford to buy homes and more of 
them could afford more expensive homes so that house prices went up. ‘Big ticket 
mortgages were aggressively sold to millions who could not normally afford them by 
offering low “teaser” interest rates that would later be readjusted to jack up payments 
from the new homeowners.’ (Bello 2008)  
The demand for housing as an investment, caused house prices to increase even more. 
This demand increased after the stock market declines in 2000 and 2001 when 
nervous investors moved from the stock market to property as a safer investment 
(Gupta 2008).  
 
CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCIAL DEREGULATION 
As we have seen, as a result of neoliberal policies, wealth accumulated in the hands of 
the few who searched for ways to invest it that were more profitable than investment 
in production. The financial sector offered lucrative investment opportunities, 
exacerbating the volatility of markets that accompanies ‘massive speculation’ 
(Muzaffar 2008).  
The neoliberal opposition to government intervention in business and markets, and in 
particular the deregulation of financial institutions, allowed financial markets to 
become more and more complex as traders worked out more and more ways to make 
money from both rising and falling markets, using derivatives, credit default swaps, 
and other mechanisms that were often beyond the understanding of the layperson and 
many politicians (Bello 2008). 
…everyone acknowledges by now that Wall Street’s capacity to innovate and 
turn out more and more sophisticated financial instruments had run far 
ahead of government’s regulatory capability, not because government was 
not capable of regulating but because the dominant neoliberal, laissez-faire 
attitude prevented government from devising effective mechanisms with 
which to regulate (Bello 2008). 
One investment mechanism was ‘collateralized debt obligations’ (CDO’s), which turned 
home mortgages into a tradeable commodity. Banks could earn fees from setting up 
mortgages and then sell on the mortgage so as to free up their money to establish 
more mortgages. Once the mortgage was sold on, the bank did not have to worry about 
whether the mortgage would be paid off and so it was less concerned about ability to 
pay when it approved loans. ‘Banks began using call centers and high-pressure tactics 
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to mass-produce mortgages because the profit was in volume—how many loans could 
be approved how fast.’ (Gupta 2008) 
To make these mortgages attractive to investors, the banks had them assured by 
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, which to investors was as good as a government 
guarantee for the mortgages since they were sure the US government would not allow 
these institutions to go bankrupt. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, banks and hedge funds 
bundled mortgages together as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to sell them to 
investors who would then own the right to receive mortgage payments (Gupta 2008). 
MBSs were further bundled with other investment products into CDO’s. The various 
middle-people who were involved in selling them on had an interest in understating 
the risks associated with these CDOs and because financial markets had been 
deregulated they were free to do so. Banks and foreign financial institutions were 
ready to believe assurances of low risk because they assumed house prices would 
continue to rise indefinitely (Bello 2008, Gupta 2008).  
However, rising house prices led to a building boom and an oversupply of housing, 
contributing to the bursting of the housing price bubble. Oversupply was exacerbated 
when interest rates were increased and hundreds of thousands of people could no 
longer afford their mortgage payments and their houses came back onto the market 
(Gupta 2008). When this happened the owners of the MBSs and CDOs found that the 
houses were now worth much less than the mortgages they had bought and for 
companies like Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Bear 
Stearns, their consequent losses were more than they could afford and they were 
threatened with bankruptcy (Bello 2008).  
Other companies such as the American International Group (AIG) lost money on 
credit default swaps – ‘derivatives that make it possible for investors to bet on the 
possibility that companies will default on repaying loans. Such bets on credit defaults 
now make up a $45 trillion market that is entirely unregulated.’ (Bello 2008) 
Financial institutions around the world were exposed to these CDOs and suffered 
major losses; some having to be bailed out by governments. The collapse and near 
collapse of major financial institutions led to a series of panics in stock markets 
around the world, wiping trillions of dollars off the value of stock. Falling share prices, 
combined with the unavailability of credit as banks became more cautious, caused a 
decline in business and consumer confidence as well as a slump in consumer demand 
and lowered economic growth, which have in turn fed rising levels of unemployment 
and recession.  
The response of governments around the world has been aimed at stimulating their 
economies. In Australia although Kevin Rudd has argued for more international 
financial regulation his economic policies continue to be largely based on faith in 
markets. While the Rudd government stimulus packages include some proposed 
infrastructure investment they rely too heavily on providing consumers with spending 
money in the vain hope that the market will ensure that people spend it in ways that 
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